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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART:
A CONTEMPORARYJURIST'S VIEW
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

RODNEY

K.

SMITH*

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite Justice Potter Stewart's twenty-three years of service
on the United States Supreme Court, legal commentators have

been frustrated in their efforts to classify his judicial philosophy in
an ideological sense. BecauseJustice Stewart's judicial opinions do
not conveniently fall into either the liberal or the conservative
mold, commentators have traditionally taken the easy way out and

have classified Justice Stewart as a "moderate."

1

Recently,,

*J.D.,J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1977; LL. M., University of
Pennsylvania, 1982; S.J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota.
1. See Binion, JusticePotter Stewart on Racial Equality: What it Means to be a Moderate, 6 HAsrINOS
CoNrsT. L.Q. 853 (1979). Binion summarizes prior conclusions regarding Justice Stewart's
ideological classification and, clearly if unintentionally, depicts the elusive nature of such
classification efforts:
Although little detailed attention has been paid to Stewart by legal scholars, there
has been a debate about where to place him on the ideological scale. Steamer has
concluded that Stewart has been more liberal thanjustices Harlan and Whittaker....
Alternatively, Rodell has argued that Stewart is more likely than not to be among the
liberals.... Abraham takes a somewhat more tentative position in viewing Stewart as
a "progressive-conservative or moderately liberal." . . . Other analysts, however,
have concluded that Stewart is definitely neither liberal nor conservative. . ..
Similarly, Rohde and Spaeth have viewed Stewart as "neutral."
Id. at 855 n.9 (citations omitted). See alsoJustice Potter Stewart: An Interview, Nat'l L.J., July 12, 1982,
at 11, col. I [hereinafter cited as Interview] (Justice Stewart is referred to as a "pragmatic
moderate.").
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however, Lloyd Cutler more accurately described justice Stewart's
judicial temperament when he noted, "Perhaps [Justice Stewart's]
2
finest judicial quality has been his imperviousness to typecasting."
Unfortunately, Justice Stewart's "imperviousness to typecasting" evidently has contributed to a general feeling among
legal scholars that there is little reason to analyze the judicial
philosophy Justice Stewart articulated in his opinions. Given this
abandonment of analysis, there is a substantial threat that his views
will soon drift into relative obscurity. Such obscurity is
unwarranted and imprudent. While Justice Stewart's judicial
philosophy may defy conventional ideological classification, it does
have an internal consistency and coherence that can be delineated
and that surely will be missed on the Court. Thus, while refraining
from classifying Justice Stewart as conservative, moderate, or
liberal, this Article will examine some of the common procedural
and substantive themes appearing in his opinions that deal with the
issue of religious liberty.
Justice Stewart himself is enlightening concerning his judicial
"temperament.' ' 3 On his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Justice Stewart candidly replied to two questions regarding his
judicial temperament or philosophy. He was first asked about his
judicial philosophy. To this he replied, "I really don't know what it
is. " 4 Evidently knowing the value of persistence, the interviewer
next asked whetherJustice Stewart considered himself a liberal or a
conservative. Stewart replied that he preferred to "be thought of as
a lawyer. " 5 Similarly, in 1954 on his appointment to the court
of appeals Justice Stewart offered a further insight into his temperament when asked whether he felt that his lack of judicial
experience would be a handicap on the bench. He responded that
"being fair-minded is something that's either there or not.' '6 He
7
has also said that" [f]airness is really what justice is."
Near the end of his career on the Supreme Court, Justice
Stewart described the proper function of a member of the Court in
the judicial decision making process as follows:
The process can be and often is a lonely troubling
experience for fallible human beings conscious that their
2. Cutler, Mr.Justice Stewart:A PersonalReminiscence,95 HARV. L. REV. 11, 15 (1981).
3. "Temperament" rather than "philosophy" or "ideology" is used because, as will be shown,
it better describes Justice Stewart's tendencies and judicial performance.
4. Note, Mr. Justice Potter Stewart, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 526, 527 (1965) (quoting N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1958, at 1, col. 1).
5. Id.
6. Paschal, Mr. Justice Stewart on the Court of Appeals, 1959 DUKE L. J. 325, 326 (1959) (quoting

N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1958, at 24, col. 2).
7. Id. at n.5 (quoting 4 Yale L. Rep., Winter 1958, at 10).
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best may not be adequate to the challenge. A Justice does
not forget how much may depend on his decision. He
knows it may affect the course of important social,
economic and political currents in our national life. But
the fact that Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States have always been called upon to face and to decide
issues that may involve some of the dominant social,
political, economic and even moral and philosophical
problems generated by their times does not mean that the
Court is charged with making social, political, economic
or philosophical or moral decisions. It is quite the
contrary. The Court is not a council of platonic guardians
whose job it is to decide difficult and delicate questions
according to the justices' notions of what is just or wise or
politic. To the extent that this function is a governmental
function at all, it lies with the people's elected
representatives, the legislative and executive branches. 8
In this paragraph, Justice Stewart effectively supplies three
interrelated insights into his temperament. These recur throughout
his opinions: he is restrained in some measure by his own sense of
human fallibility; 9 he refuses to arrogate to himself the role of a
platonic guardian; and he acknowledges that the pressing policy
issues of the day must be addressed by someone, but largely defers
to elected representatives.
Given the self imposed parameters noted above, Justice
Stewart continued:
The judicial branch is charged with deciding
controversies according to the Constitution and the laws
of the United States. The issues arise in the framework of
concrete litigation, cases or controversies. They may be
decided on particularized facts bound in the record made
in a trial court or in an administrative agency. This is not
to say that it is often easy to resolve these controversies by
simply referring to the words of the statute or the
Constitution.
So far as the Constitution is concerned the founding
8. Stewart, OperationsandPractice,A Comparison: The UnitedStates Supreme Court, 3 CAN.-U.S. L.J.

82, 84(1980).
9. This acknowledgment of his and other judges' personal limitations undoubtedly contributes
to the view that he falls within the Frankfurter-Harlan camp rather than within the Douglas camp,
despite the fact that neitherJustice Frankfurter norJustice Douglas was inclined to engage in self-

depreciation.
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fathers knew better than to pin down details too closely.
They drafted principles rather than precise details. Thus
it is that the Constitution does not take the form of a
litany of specifics. There are not many cases where the
answers are clear one way or the other. Particularly
difficult are the cases which involve conflicts between
individual human beings and governmental power,
whether in the form of state or federal government.
The field, which in my time has primarily absorbed
the Court's attention, is constitutional law. In those
situations where the Constitution or statutes do not
clearly decide the case, a Justice must rely upon his own
basic understanding of the Constitution and the law,
bringing to bear his own intellect, his own learning, his
own experience and his own conscience. For him the
complex phenomenon that lawyers know as law is always
an unfinished tapestry the weaving of which is never
done. 10
Thus, we learn of Justice Stewart's near obsession with the
"particularized facts bound in the record" of the lower court;" of
his understanding that while the words of the Constitution must be
adhered to, they are intentionally general and often require
construction; and that he has particular difficulty with cases
presenting conflicts between the rights of individuals and
governmental power.
Therefore, while it is generally conceded that Justice Stewart
was judicially nonideological, 12 he did develop a style or
10. Stewart, supra note 8, at 84-85.
11. Cutler has noted, regarding Justice Stewart's strict adherence to the facts, that Justice
Stewart's "opinions would not gloss over critical facts, and they dealt fully and openly with each
issue that had been raised." Cutler, supra note 2, at 15. Justice Stewart effectively said the same thing
in a recent interview in which he argued against expansive opinions by emphasizing:
The danger is the potential for harm of a judge or justice straying beyond his or her
function. That's fine for the other two branches the political branches of
government, the legislative branch or the executive branch - but the function of a
judge or ajustice is to decide cases that are brought to his or her court.
Interview, supra note 1, at 21, col. 2. Thus, for Justice Stewart, a judge, unlike a legislator or
executive, was strictly bound by the particularized facts in the record - to stray from those facts was
to court danger.
12. In describingJustice Stewart's judicial temperament, Justice Powell noted:
In carrying out his responsibilities on the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart was
ever conscious of the distinction between his personal preference and the proper role of
a judge. "[T]he first duty of a justice," he said, is "to remove from his judicial work
his own moral, philosophical, political, or religious beliefs."
Powell,Justice Stewart, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (198 1) (footnotes omitted). See also Stewart, Rejections on
the Supreme Court, LITIcATION, Spring 1982, at 8. Justice Stewart commented as follows:
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temperament that reveals his view of the judicial system in general.
Additionally, an analysis of his opinions in light of his
temperament, clarifies the opinions that deal with religious liberty.
Judge Broderick also asserted that Justice Stewart's style, rather
than his personal ideology, characterizes his judicial view. 13 Judge
Broderick concluded that Justice Stewart's fidelity to these stylistic
maxims resulted in "a body of opinions which are logical,
restrained, eminently readable, and terse.' '14
Most of what Justice Stewart stated concerning the proper
functioning of the judicial process aligned him with the views of
Justice Harlan and prompted Professor Friedman to conclude:
His unique approach and style, his concern about
preserving the important judicial role of the Court, his
sense of judicial restraint make him in many ways the
worthy successor to Justice Harlan in stressing the quiet
virtues of the Supreme Court without surrendering its
essential role in preserving and protecting individual
rights. 15
Undoubtedly, Justice Stewart would be pleased by Professor
Friedman's description of him as a worthy successor to Justice
Harlan, because Justice Stewart has great respect for Justice
Harlan's judicial talents. In two recent interviews Justice Stewart
listed the Justices of the Supreme Court he most admired. In both
interviews he listed Justices Black, Harlan, and Frankfurter as the
great men he served with on the Court. 1 6 Conspicuous by his
absence wasJustice Douglas.
For Justice Stewart, Justice Black was "a very formidable
advocate, a very kindly person and a very engaging and lovable
person, but very formidable.' 1 7 Justice Frankfurter, on the other

IMlany

people think that a member of the Supreme Court reaches the answer he

wants to reach for his own political or policy reasons and then, either by himself or
through his law clerk, makes up the rationalization for that result. To me the job was
never that. It was reaching the result required by the law and the Constitution, even
though it might have been a result that wasn't particularly sympathetic with me.
Id.
13. Broderck.Justice Potter Stewart, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 297, 301 (1981). The stylistic maxims or
criteriaJudge Broderick gleans from Justice Stewart's opinions are a bit more general and expansive
than those listed in this Article. Judge Broderick asserts that Justice Stewart's judicial style is best
"described as entailing the application of a litany of maxims: (a) shorter is preferred over longer; (b)
narrower is preferred over broader; (c) no issue is to be decided that does not have to be decided; (d)
apply practical standards, not platitudes or generalities: and (e) respect precedent." Id.
14. Id.
15. 5 L. FRIEDMAN, THEJUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 304 (1978).
16. Interview, supra note 1, at I1,col. 3; Stewart, supra note 12, at 13.
17. Stewart, supra note 12, at 13.
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hand, "was almost unique in his knowledge of the court and his
'
personality." 18
Finally and perhaps most revealingly, Justice
Harlan "was a very great American lawyer, having the attributes
of everything good that comes to my mind when I hear the words
'fine American lawyer.' "19 In another interview, Justice Stewart
elaborated his respect forJustice Harlan by noting:
He was not so much a scholar as he was a lawyer in the
best sense of the word, although certainly his academic
scholarship was equal to the best and highest demands of
the Court. He was more than just a scholar; he had
humanity and wisdom and compassion that carried him
way beyond an ivory-tower academic. He was not so
much of a conservative as he was a very responsible,
20
conscientious, and careful person.
Justice Stewart personally espoused and valued many of the
attributes of Justice Harlan. Justice Stewart's depiction of the
virtues of Justice Harlan is itself helpful in understanding Justice
Stewart.
Before examining Justice Stewart's position on religious
liberty a final point should be raised. Professor Friedman
chronicled the Stewart years on the Court. His exposition covers
Justice Stewart's role on the Court in obscenity, freedom of the
press, race relations, and search and seizure cases, but avoids
discussion of Justice Stewart's role in religious liberty cases.
Professor Friedman simply does not mention Justice Stewart's
contribution in this area. Professor Friedman may have
disregarded Justice Stewart's contribution in this area because it
has primarily been articulated in dissenting or concurring opinions.
It seems equally plausible, however, that Professor Friedman, who
surely understands the importance of the dissent as an expression of
one's judicial philosophy, joins those in the academic community
who are particularly embarrassed by Justice Stewart's opinions in
the prayer in public schools cases, Engel v. Vitale2 and Abington
22
School Districtv. Schempp.
This uneasiness or guarded embarrassment provokes the
18. Interview, supra note 1, at 11, col: 3.
19. Interview, supra note 1, at 11, col. 3.
20. Stewart, supra note 12, at 13.
21. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (government precluded from composing official prayers to be recited in
public schools).
22. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (establishment clause prohibits states from requiring recitation of the
Lord's Prayer or reading of Bible verses in public schools).
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following conclusions: With very few exceptions, 23 those who feel
uneasy with Justice Stewart's opinions in the religious liberty area
have not read the cases with requisite care; and those who attack
the Stewart position as illiberal in a civil libertarian sense are
themselves caught in a dilemma regarding individual rights by
virtue of their wooden interpretation of the establishment clause.
An examination of Justice Stewart's religious liberty opinions
provides not only a revealing forum for studying his judicial
temperament, but also provides insight into the weaknesses of both
his and his detractors' positions in the religious liberty area.
II. THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE STEWART
In the early 1960sJustice Stewart filed dissents in three major
24
cases dealing with the religious liberty issue: Braunfeld v. Brown,
Engel v. Vitale,25 and Abington School District v. Schempp. 26 While the
beliefs articulated in those dissents remained largely unchanged,
they were not articulated as clearly in the 1970s. In the 1970s the
Court became increasingly expansive in its construction of the free
exercise clause, which minimized justice Stewart's need to dissent.
Additionally, from the mid 1960s until Justice Stewart left the
bench, the Court decided fewer establishment clause cases. The
Court instead invoked its discretionary powers and generally
denied certiorari. 27 This judicial reluctance has continued into the
1980s and has been buttressed by a recent decision that indicated a
lack of standing to raise an establishment clause objection, Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church &
State, Inc.28
23. See Pollak, Forward: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. Rav. 62 (1963). Professor
Pollak disagrees with the Stewart position, but seems to have an understanding ofJustice Stewart's
position in Engel. Id.
24. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws did not violate Orthodox Jews' rights under free
exercise clause).
25. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (government precluded from composing official prayers to be recited in
public schools).
26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (establishment clause prohibits states from requiring recitation of
Lord's Prayer or reading of Bible verses in public schools).
27. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
987 (1980); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Johnson v.
Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976).
28. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The Valley Forge case is not only indicative of the Court's reluctance to
hear cases raising factual situations in which the free exercise and establishment clauses conflict, but
it is also illustrative of the Court's increased willingness to limit establishment clause attacks that are
based on a strict separationist rationale. In Valley Forge Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., a group dedicated to maintaining strict separation of church and state, sought to
invalidate the disposal of certain "surplus property" to a sectarian institution under a federal act
that permitted the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to dispose of surplus property for
educational use. Rather than confronting the underlying substantive issues, the Court simply found
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In Braunfeld v. Brown, 29 the first of the 1960s cases, the Court
upheld a Pennsylvania criminal statute that proscribed Sunday
retail sales of certain enumerated commodities. 30 Mr. Braunfeld,
an Orthodox Jewish merchant, contended that the statute violated
his rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 3 1 In
a plurality opinion Chief Justice Warren, joined by the somewhat
unlikely triumvirate of Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker, stated
that while the free exercise clause strictly forbade compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or religious practice, the burden
on Mr. Braunfeld was merely indirect. 32 In the companion case,
McGowan v. Maryland,33 the Court rejected the argument that, as a
matter of law, Sunday closing laws violated the religion clauses of
the first amendment. 34 The Court emphasized that while the
original purpose behind Sunday closing laws was clearly religious,
the laws had since lost that unconstitutional religious taint and were
independently supportable as a public welfare matter because the
laws served the public interest in a uniform day of rest and
recreation.

35

Justice Douglas dissented in both McGowan and Braunfeld and
argued that the reverse side of an establishment of religion "isa
burden on the 'free exercise' of religion." ' 36 Justices Brennan and
Stewart 3 7 would permit the government to establish a uniform day
of rest on Sunday provided the government granted an exemption
for those sabbatarians whose religious beliefs would otherwise be
that Americans United failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury and, therefore, held that the
plaintiff lacked the standing necessary to raise the establishment clause issue, despite the fact that
Americans United clearly had a strong interest in the resolution of the underlying substantive issue.
In his dissent Justice Brennan criticized the effort of the majority, noting that "the opinion of the
Court is a stark example of. . . [the] unfortunate trend of resolving cases at the 'threshold' while
obscuring the nature of the underlying rights and interests at stake." Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation ofChurch & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490-91 (1982) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
29. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
30. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961). Chief Justice Warren wrote the plurality
opinion in which Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker joined. Justice Harlan concurred in the
judgment. Justices Brennan and Stewart concurred with the disposition of the claims under the
establishment and equal protection clauses. Id.at 609-10.
31. Id. at 601. Mr. Braunfeld also contended that the statute violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and was a law respecting an establishment of religion. The Court
rejected these contentions because of its decision in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 366 U.S. at 601.
32. 366 U.S. at 607. The Court noted that the law might cause economic hardship, but did not
"make a religious practice itself unlawful." Id. at 606.
33. 366 U.S. 420(1961).
34. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961). The Court only addressed whether the
laws violated the establishment clause, not whether they violated the free exercise clause. Id. at 42931.
35. Id. at 446-49.
36. Id. at 578 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
37. In Braunfeld Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on the establishment clause and
equal protection claims, but dissented on the free exercise claim. 366 U.S. at 610. Justice Stewart
dissented. Id. at 616.
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burdened.3 8 Justice Stewart concluded that the law cruelly forced
an Orthodox Jew to choose between religion and economic
39
survival.
Two years later the Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner40 vindicated Justices Brennan's and Stewart's position. In Sherbert the
Court held that a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church
who refused to work on Saturday was entitled to unemployment
compensation.4 1 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, was
satisfied to state: "Our holding today is only that South Carolina
may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to
constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting
the day of rest. "42 Justice Stewart, however, could not reconcile the
Court's holding with its decision in Braunfeld43 and concurred in the
44
judgment.
The Court decided Sherbert after the prayer cases, Engel and
Schempp. This provoked a further comment by Justice Stewart in
which he concluded that the Court's approach to the establishment
38. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan
stated:
What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to impede appellants' freedom of worship? What overbalancing need is
so weighty in the constitutional scale that it justifies this substantial, though indirect,
limitation of appellants' freedom? ... It is the mere convenience of having everyone
rest on the same day. It is to defend this interest that the Court holds that a State need
not follow the alternative route of granting an exemption for those who in good faith
observe a day of rest other than Sunday.
Id. Justice Stewart noted that he agreed "with substantially all that Mr. Justice Brennan has
written." Id. at 616 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
39. Id. Justice Stewart believed Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law presented "a choice which I
think no State can constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be swept under the
rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness." Id.
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (South Carolina statute abridged appellant's right to free exercise of
religion).
41. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 417 (Stewart,J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded in Sherbert:
I cannot agree that today's decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld. . . . The
Court says that there was a "less direct burden upon religious practices" in that case
than in this. With all respect, I think the Court is mistaken, simply as a matter of fact.
The Braunfeld case involved a state criminalstatute ....
The impact upon the appellant's religious freedom in the present case is
considerably less onerous.
Id. (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 413-14.Justice Stewart expressed his views on religious liberty in his concurrence:
I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the
free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty protected
by the Free Exercise Clause . . . . And I regret that on occasion . . . the Court has
shown what has seemed to me a distressing insensitivity to the appropriate demands of
this constitutional guarantee.
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clause was insensitive and wooden. 45 Justice Stewart noted that the
majority's decision precipitated a collision of the establishment and
free exercise clauses. 4 6 South Carolina could deny unemployment
benefits to a person refusing to work on Saturday for nonreligious
reasons, even if the refusal to work was a matter of conscience or
deep personal conviction, but could not deny benefits for refusals to
work on Saturday based on religious grounds. Clearly, Justice
Stewart argued, the Court's decision resulted in a preference for
religious over nonreligious refusals, which would seemingly be
forbidden if the case had been raised on establishment rather than
free exercise grounds. ForJustice Stewart, however, this presented
no problem because he believed the Court had incorrectly
construed the establishment clause. 47 Although Justice Stewart
enjoyed the general comradeship of some of his colleagues,
particularly Justice Brennan, in the free exercise context, he stood
alone in the establishment clause context in the early 1960s.
In Engel v. Vitale48 the New York Board of Regents
commissioned the preparation of a nondenominational prayer for
use in the public schools and directed that the prayer be recited
daily in each class. The Board permitted those who desired to
refrain from reciting the prayer to be dismissed. In Engel Justice
Black, for the majority, wrote that the establishment clause
precluded the government from "compos[ing] official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government.'
Justice Black distinguished
the purpose of the establishment clause from that of the free
exercise clause. 50
'49

45. Id. at 414. Justice Stewart concluded that "[t]he result is that there are many situations
where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the
Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 415. Justice Stewart indicated:
I think the process of constitutional decision in the area of the relationships between
government and religion demands considerably more than the invocation of broadbrushed rhetoric ....
And I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in
the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of
hospitality and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief. In short, I think our
Constitution commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom not only for a minority, however small - not only for the majority, however large but for each of us.
Id. at 415-16.
48. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
49. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). The Court held that the prayer violated the
establishment clause. Id.
50. Id. at 430-31. Justice Black believed the clauses dealt with different kinds of governmental
interference. Id. at 430. He concluded, "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause,
does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not." Id. Justice Black also noted that the purpose of the establishment
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Justice Stewart disagreed with the decision of the Court and
much of its accompanying dicta. 5' He dissented and noted that he
could not see "how an 'official religion' is established by letting
those who want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary ... to deny
the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to
deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of
our Nation. ' 52 Justice Stewart's analysis in religious liberty cases
focused on the issue of coercion. 53 Given the lack of a showing of
compulsion to participate in Engel, Justice Stewart recognized the
rights of those students who desired to pray. The majority in Engel,
however, prohibited the prayer practice without a showing of
54
compulsion or coercion.
Justice Stewart also disagreed with the majority's historical
analysis and believed the majority skirted the related issue of
governmental prayers commonly used to open legislative and
judicial sessions. 55 For Justice Stewart the Court's action
constituted an unwarranted repudiation of America's religious
heritage. 56 Justice Stewart felt that Justice Black's use of the wall of
separation metaphor was particularly troublesome because it
implied that difficult issues could be easily resolved by the
perfunctory invocation of Jefferson's metaphor rather than by a
critical analysis of the particular facts in the record. 57
In Abington School Districtv. Schempp 58 the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Clark, held that the establishment clause prohibits state
laws and practices that require either the reading of Bible verses or
student recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the opening of the public
school day. 59 Justice Clark utilized a two-prong test and found that
because both the purpose and the primary effect of the reading and
clause went beyond the prevention of coercion of religious minorities: "Its first and most immediate
purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and degrade religion." Id. at 43 1.
51. Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Justice Stewart rioted in Engel that New York
did not interfere with the free exercise of religion because it did not compel the students to recite the
prayer. Id. at 445 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 430. The majority noted that a showing of compulsion would be necessary under the
free exercise clause but not under the establishment clause. Id.
55. Id. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart cited Zorach v. Clauson to summarize the
extent of the religious tradition in government institutions: " 'We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.' " Id. at 450 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952)).
56. 370 U.S. at 450 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas also
commented on the existence of other governmentally sanctioned expressions of our nation's religious
heritage. However, Justice Douglas concluded that the government should not be permitted to
finance religious exercise in any form and he would have invalidated most, if not all, of those
practices. Id. at 437 (Douglas,J., concurring).
57. Id. at 445-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
59. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
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recitation were religious rather than secular in nature, they were
prohibited. 60
Justices Douglas and Brennan merely concurred, but
essentially agreed with Justice Clark's opinion that the religious
nature of the Bible reading and recitation made them
unconstitutional. 6 1 Justice Brennan, however, did analyze
thoroughly the history of the establishment clause and also
examined the evolution of public education in America. 62 Justice
Brennan considered whether the excusal provision eliminated the
coercion issue. He concluded, "The answer is that the excusal
procedure itself necessarily operates in such a way as to infringe the
'63
rights of free exercise of those children who wish to be excused."
Justice Brennan, therefore, concluded that excusal provisions were
inherently offensive and invalid as a matter of law.
Justice Stewart responded with a lengthy dissent and
concluded that a remand was in order because the records in the
two cases before the Court were so deficient that an informed or
responsible determination of the constitutional issues was
impossible. 64 For Justice Stewart the coercion issue was an issue of
fact and not a matter of law. In SchemppJustice Stewart revealed his
general position on religious liberty in greater detail than in any
60. Id. Justice Clark stated the test as follows:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222.
61. Id. at 227 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 230 (Brennanj., concurring).
62. Id. at 237-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice Brennan drew the following
conclusion from his examination of the historical issues:
While it is clear to me that the Framers meant the Establishment Clause to prohibit
more than the creation of an established federal church such as existed in England, I
have no doubt that, in their preoccupation with the imminent question of established
churches, they gave no distinct consideration to the particular question whether the
clause also forbade devotional exercises in public institutions.
Id.
63. Id. at 288.
64. Id. at 319 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted the following about the cases consolidated on appeal:
[Both] involve provisions which explicitly permit any student who wishes, to be
excused from participation in the exercises. There is no evidence in either case as to
whether there would exist any coercion of any kind upon a student who did not want to
participate. No evidence at all was adduced in the Murray case, because it was decided
on a demurrer.
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other case. In his dissentJustice Stewart reiterated his view that the
Court erred when it failed to acknowledge that there are many
areas in which the free exercise clause and the establishment clause
overlap and that the clauses must be read as complementary in
those areas. 65 Justice Stewart believed the majority indulged in a
doctrinaire reading of each clause to the exclusion of the other,
giving rise to an irreconcilable conflict in interpretation. After he
noted that the first amendment was adopted solely to limit the
federal government,6 6 he nevertheless acknowledged that the first
amendment also limited the states because of its incorporation
67
through the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Stewart chided the majority for implying that children
had no right to engage in religious practices in the public schools. 68
Furthermore, for Justice Stewart it was not enough, given the
increasingly pervasive nature of compulsory public education, to
say that a child need not be permitted to pray at school because he
could exercise his religion at home. 69 Justice Stewart then rather
enigmatically noted a distinction between a religious right and a
privilege. 70 He concluded that "the question presented is not
whether exercises such as those at issue here are constitutionally
compelled, but rather whether they are constitutionally invalid.
And that issue, in my view, turns on the question of coercion." 71
Justice Stewart also concluded that school boards might
conceivably formulate noncoercive, constitutional policies. 72 Thus,
65. Id. at 309.

66. See W.

BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

5(1976).

Madison's original version of the first amendment would have extended its coverage to the states,
but this proposal was quickly shelved for a version that would extend only to the federal government,
effectively exempting state establishments and religious activities from the strictures of the first
amendment. Id.
67. 374 U.S. at 310.
68. Id. at 312-13. Justice Stewart thus saw this as a free exercise issue. Id.
69. Id. at 313. Justice Stewart concluded:
For a compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if
religious exercises are held to be impermissible in schools, religion is placed at an
artificial and state-created disadvantage. . . . And a refusal to permit religious
exercises thus is seen, not as a realization of state neutrality but rather as the
establishment of a religion of secularism.
Id.
70. Id. at 316.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 318. Justice Stewart noted:
It is conceivable that these school boards, or even all school boards, might eventually
find it impossible to administer a system of religious exercises during school hours in
such a way as to meet this constitutional standard - in such a way as completely to
free from any kind of official coercion those who do not affirmatively want to
participate. But I think we must not assume that school boards so lack the qualities of
inventiveness and good will as to make impossible the achievement of that goal.
Id. at 320 (footnote omitted).
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Justice Stewart would
have remanded both cases for further
3
evidentiary hearings. 7
In SchemppJustice Stewart discussed the children's interests at
some length. He also discussed the religious rights of children in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 74 a religious rights case in which the Court held
that the state could not penalize Amish parents who refused to send
their children to school beyond the eighth grade. 75 Justice Stewart
pointed out in his concurrence that the case did not involve a
difference of religious beliefs between the parents and the
children. 76 Thus, while Justice Stewart implied that he recognized
that children have first amendment rights, he returned to his
position that such rights must be based on actual proof, not on
judicial conjecture.
Issues analogous to those raised in Engel and Schempp arose
again in 1980 in Stone v. Graham.77 In a per curiam decision the
Court held that a Kentucky statute that required public schools to
post copies of the Ten Commandments in classrooms had a
preeminently religious purpose, although private funds paid for the
copies and the State avowed a secular purpose. 78 The Court held
that the statute violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
Justice Stewart, true to form, dissented in Stone. 79 He stated
only that he felt the Kentucky courts had applied "correct
constitutional criteria in reaching their decisions." 8 0 Again, Justice
Stewart was reluctant to act perfunctorily under the auspices of the
establishment clause when the record indicated a secular purpose
behind the regulation and the record did not indicate that posting
the Ten Commandments would be coercive of anyone's rights of
conscience.
Another area that aids an examination of Justice Stewart's
views regarding religious 'liberty involves the issue of aid to
sectarian schools. In .Roemer v. Board of Public Works 8 1 Justice
Stewart, who generally agreed with the majority and permitted
such aid,8 2 dissented. He distinguished his prior position by noting
73. Id.
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
76. Id. at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart noted that the case did not involve
children who wished to attend public schools against their parents' wishes. Id.
77. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
78. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980).
79. Id. at 43 (Stewart,J., dissenting).

80. Id.
81. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (Justice Stewart joined ChiefJustice
Burger's plurality opinion); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Justice Stewart joined
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that the institutions in the previous cases "made no attempt to
inculcate the religious beliefs of the affiliated church." 8 3 In Roemer
Justice Stewart concluded that government support of the church
affiliated school unconstitutionally advanced religion .84
Additionally, in Flast v. Cohen85 Justice Stewart joined the
opinion of the Court which held that "a federal taxpayer has
standing to assert that a specific expenditure of federal funds
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 86 In
Flast, the Court emphasized that the drafters of the establishment
clause feared that the taxing and spending power might be used to
87
favor a particular religion.
Finally, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division88 and Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 89 Justice Stewart joined the majority in two free
exercise cases. In Thomas and Heffron the Court initially found that
free exercise rights were implicated when the state infringed
religious expression." The Court then determined whether a
compelling state interest sufficiently outweighed the first
amendment interest involved and whether the governmental
regulation constituted the least restrictive alternative by which the
governmental interest could be furthered. 9 1 Justice Stewart, who
had long advocated that only a strong, actual governmental interest
could outweigh first amendment rights in both free exercise of
religion and freedom of expression cases, undoubtedly was pleased
by the Court's increased willingness to recognize the priority of
such rights.
In his final opinion dealing, albeit somewhat tangentially, with
religious rights Justice Stewart wrote for the majority in Harris v.
McRae.9 2 In McRae the Court upheld the Hyde amendment that
denied federal funds for abortions if the mother's life was not
ChiefJustice Burger's opinion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Justice Stewartjoined
the majority opinion ofJustice White).
83. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 774 (1976)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 775. Justice Stewart believed the state money advanced religion even though the state
vigilantly attempted to avoid it. Id.
85. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
86. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).

87. Id.
88. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
89. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
90. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)
(control of dissemination of Krishna's religious views affects first amendment rights); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (denial of unemployment
benefits toJehovah's Witness infringed free exercise right).
91. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-55 (statute was reasonable time, place, and manner restriction);
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 ("Neither of the interests advanced is sufficiently compelling to justify the
burden upon Thomas' religious liberty.").
92. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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endangered. 93 Justice Stewart noted that the Hyde amendment did
not violate the establishment clause simply because it happened to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some religions. 94 Justice
Stewart thus merely reiterated his view that, at a minimum, there
must be some actual proof of coercion or religious taint before the
Court could justifiably invalidate a statutory provision on the
grounds that the regulation violated the establishment clause.
In McRae Justice Stewart expressly rejected the appellees'
contention that the Hyde amendment violated the first amendment
because it penalized the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy by abortion. Justice Stewart concluded that "[a] refusal
to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with
the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity" 95 and distinguished
Sherbert. He emphasized that McRae would be analogous to Sherbert
"if Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from
an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had
exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her
pregnancy by abortion.' '96 Thus, in McRaeJustice Stewart raised
anew the right-privilege distinction he originally noted in Schempp.
Evidently, if the state in McRae had withheld all Medicaid benefits
from a woman who sought an abortion, Justice Stewart would find
the requisite governmental coercion. Thus, the government may
refuse to fund or to permit the exercise of a first amendment right,
unless the refusal imposes a coercive penalty on that activity. 9
Finally, Justice Stewart concluded in McRae that the Court
"need not address the merits of appellees' arguments concerning
the Free Exercise Clause, because the appellees lack[ed] standing to
raise a free exercise challenge to the Hyde Amendment. "98 Justice
Stewart noted that none of the appellees alleged the personal or
individualized interest necessary to confer standing to raise a free
93. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980). The majority found that the Hyde amendment violated neither statutory nor constitutional requirements. Id.

94. Id. at 319-20. The Court noted that the amendment "is as much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values toward abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion."
Id. at 319.

95. Id. at 317 n.19.
96 Id.
97. Id. at 317. Justice Stewart concluded that "although the government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of
its own creation. Indigency falls into the latter category." Id. at 316. Thus, since the government was

not responsible for the creation of the indigency, which limited a woman's ability to exercise her right
to an abortion, it could not be required to fund the abortion choice. Since injustice Stewart's view
the Hyde amendment left the indigent woman in the same position as if Congress had chosen to
subsidize no health costs at all, the woman's range of choice had not been unconstitutionally limited.
Id. at 317.

98. Id. at 320.
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exercise challenge to the Hyde amendment. 99
Justice Brennan dissented in McRae. He cited Sherbert and
argued, "It would belabor the obvious to expound at any great
length on the illegitimacy of a state policy that interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights through selective bestowal of
governmental favors." 10 0 He also addressed Justice Stewart's
rejection of the appellees' argument that the Hyde amendment
unconstitutionally penalizes a woman when she exercises her
fundamental right to an abortion. 10 For Justice Brennan, unlike
Justice Stewart, the case involved more than "a simple refusal to
fund a potential activity ... ; instead, there [was] a program that

selectively [funded] but one of two choices of a constitutionally
protected decision, thereby penalizing the election of the disfavored
option."10 2 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, "Whether the State
withholds only the special costs of a disfavored option or penalizes
the individual more broadly for the manner in which she exercises
her choice, it cannot interfere with a constitutionally protected
3
decision through the coercive use of governmental largesse." 10
The McRae case was not a religious liberty or religious rights
case, but it further illustrates an apparent theme in Justice
Stewart's religious rights and privileges cases. Justice Stewart was
clearly deeply solicitous of individual religious liberty. However,
there were limits to those rights. Thus, a close reading of Justice
Stewart's religious liberty opinions points out a seeming tension
between his judicial temperament and his personal predilections.
His judicial temperament demanded actual proof or evidence, and
his personal predilections stressed solicitude for individual religious
exercise.
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE STEWART'S
POSITION
It was asserted at the outset of this Article that efforts to
99. Id. Justice Stewart noted:
Since "it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion," . . . the claim
asserted here is one that ordinarily requires individual participation. . . .It is thus
clear that the participation of individual members of the Women's Division is essential
to a proper understanding and resolution of their free exercise claims. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Women's Division, along with the other named appellees, lack
standing to challenge the Hyde Amendment under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 321 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)) (footnote omitted).
100. 448 U.S. at 334 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 336 n.6.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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classify Justice Stewart's judicial philosophy in conventional terms
would prove futile. Justice Stewart's opinions in the context of
religious liberty confirm this assertion. Clearly, on issues normally
characterized as free exercise issues Justice Stewart usually aligned
04
himself with the "liberal" opinions of Justice Brennan.1
However, on establishment issues Justice Stewart typically aligned
himself with the "conservative" wing of the Court. 0 5 Therefore,
Justice Stewart's performance defies traditional classification.
When compared with his generally moderate performance in other
areas,10 6 Justice Stewart's position on religious liberty seems more
independent than moderate.
Another question is whether Justice Stewart's position is
consistent with the judicial attributes noted in the first part of this
Article: fair-mindedness; restraint in judicial review; rejection of
the role of the platonic guardian; an emphasis on the particularized
facts in the record; concern over the actual words and history of a
given constitutional provision; and a concern with the conflict
between individual rights and governmental interests.
Obviously, the preceding terms lack the content necessary for
an empirical examination that would produce effectively irrebuttable conclusions. However, Justice Stewart's opinions can
be analyzed in a general, normative sense to ascertain whether his
opinions were consistent with his temperament.
In the area of religious liberty Justice Stewart endeavored to
articulate a standard of fairness applicable to all. In Sherbert he
stated, "I think our Constitution commands the positive protection
by government of religious freedom - not only for a minority,
however small - not only for the majority, however large - but
for each of us."' 0 7 Thus, while the liberal wing of the Court has
104. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (Justice Stewart joined Justice Brennan's opinion); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Cf. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)
(statutory interpretation case in which Justice Stewart joined the majority and Justice Brennan
dissented). GivenJustice Stewart's propensity for restraint in statutory interpretation cases, it might
be inappropriate to place too much emphasis on his divergence withJustice Brennan in Hardison.
105. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Justice Stewart joined Justice Blackmun's
opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (Justice Stewart joined Justice Powell's decision);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Justice Stewart joined ChiefJustice Burger's opinion);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (Justice Stewart joined ChiefJustice Burger's opinion);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Justice Stewart joined ChiefJustice Burger's majority
opinion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Justice Stewart joined Justice White's
decision for the Court). But see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 773 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (Justice Stewart disagrees with the conservative wing of the Court on an establishment
issue).
106. See Binion, supra note 1, at 855. Binion concludes that Justice Stewart had an independent
mix in his voting record on issues of racial equality, defying classification in conventional ideological
terms. Id.
107. 374 U.S. at 416.
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been most concerned in the free exercise and establishment
contexts with the rights of minorities, Justice Stewart showed
solicitude for the rights of religious exercise of all individuals. His
emphasis on coercion as the critical factor in religion cases indicates
his desire to see that no individual is coerced or treated unfairly.
The remainder of the Court, however, has asserted that the
establishment clause "unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and
is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not." 108
Justice Stewart's tendency toward restraint, his antipathy to
the idea of platonic guardianship, and his reliance upon the
particular facts set forth in the record can all be viewed collectively
for analytical purposes. Even in his opinions in Engel and Schempp,
Justice Stewart showed restraint and shunned the role of a guardian
dispensing wisdom. 10 9 Justice Stewart reluctantly rendered
expansive policy determinations, preferring judicial restraint. He
limited himself to the particular facts in Engel and Schempp. Thus,
even when his personal convictions may have been strong, Justice
Stewart exercised restraint. This theme certainly recurred
throughout Justice Stewart's opinions on religious liberty.
Justice Stewart's historical analysis in Schempp preceded his
statutory interpretation. In his historical analysis he chided the
majority for deciding cases based on Jefferson's wall of separation
metaphor. He indicated that the metaphor bore no direct relationship to the constitutional history of the amendment.1 1 0 It might be
argued that Justice Stewart has not relied upon the words of
the Constitution because he has seemingly subsumed the
establishment clause to the free exercise clause. That objection,
however, can be countered by an assertion that the framers
intended the establishment clause to complement the free exercise
clause in its protection of an individual's right to be free from
governmental intrusion. If the purpose of the religion clauses of the
108. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
109. Pollak, supra note 23, at 73. Pollak noted that because in both Engel and Schenpp "Justice
Stewart felt that the records before the Court were insufficient to justify a confident finding one way
or another as to the way in which the programs were administered, he favored sending the cases back
to elicit further information." Id.
110. Schempp, 374 U.S. 309-10 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The wall metaphor first appeared in a
letter from Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in the early nineteenth century, and does in
fact bear little relationship to the intent of the framers at the time of the ratification of the first
amendment. While an historical exegesis is beyond the scope of this Article, it could forcefully be
argued that as a matter of pure constitutional history, Justice Stewart's analysis in Schempp is as
accurate as any historical analysis offered by a Justice regarding the intent of the framers of the
religion clauses of the first amendment.
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first amendment is protection of rights of conscience, Justice
Stewart's emphasis on the coercive effect of governmental action on
the practice of religion would be more compelling than the BlackRutledge view. 1 1 ' In fact, the majority in Schempp never articulated
their conception of the interplay between the value that inheres in
the establishment clause and the right of free exercise. Not only is
Justice Stewart's historical analysis consistent with his view of
judicial restraint, it also constitutes one of the most intellectually
honest reviews of that history by ajustice.
The preceding analysis, which confirms that Justice Stewart
adhered to the elements of his temperament in his written opinions,
leads comfortably into a critique of Justice Stewart's position.
Justice Stewart has been criticized for his opinions in establishment
clause cases. His detractors typically have criticized him on several
grounds. First, he would permit too much religious exercise in the
public sector. His detractors believe that government should be
kept completely separate from religious exercise because the
"union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion. 1 1 2 Justice Stewart's belief that a party
must prove actual coercion is also criticized as unrealistic because
indirect coercion of someone's beliefs necessarily arises whenever
government is involved in religious matters. His detractors also
argue that religious exercise in the public sector necessarily results
in unwarranted entanglement because political divisiveness arises
whenever government involves itself in religious matters. Implicitly
at least, there is yet another criticism: religion should be kept out of
the public school system because it somehow inhibits the learning
process and value inculcation normally attributed to the public
1 13
schools in our democratic society.
111. See generally L. TRIBE,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW § 14-3 (1978). Professor Tribe concludes as

follows:
It has become popular to see both the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause as expressions ofvoluntarism and separatism in the Black-Rutledge sense ....
But the actual history of the establishment clause may belie this interpretation ....
Whenever a free exercise claim conflicts with an absolute non-establishment theory,
the support of the former would be more faithful to the consensus present at the time of
the Constitutional Convention and of the First Congress.
Id. § 14-3, at 819.
112. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
113. See Hiller, The Making of a Middle-Aged PoliticalActivist, THE HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 1982, at
29. One commentator concluded:
[I]n a comparatively meager two hundred years, the United States of America has
created a society of progress, science, health, knowledge, and prosperity unparalleled
in the history of the world. Why? Because the First Amendment to our Constitution
freed the American people from the stranglehold of the church-state partnership. As a
direct result, we have led the world in opening new frontiers in medicine, technology,
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With regard to the first criticism of the union of government
and religion, Justice Stewart undoubtedly correctly asserts that
there is some inevitable overlap between government and religion.
Even Justice Black recognized this in his opinion for the Court in
Engel,114 although he proposed no resolution for the conflict. This

conflict occurs more regularly in contemporary society than it did
at the time of the founding of our nation because the government's
role has become increasingly pervasive. Given the inevitability of
the collision between government activity and the exercise of
religious rights and expression, a position based on complete or socalled absolute neutrality or separation is quixotic. Merely
asserting that absolute separation is untenable is not, however,
fully dispositive of the separationist critique because the
separationists can still assert that the union of government and
religion should be avoided whenever possible. This requires some
form of balancing test that is heavily weighted in favor of the
separationist value. Even in this regard, though, Justice Stewart's
use of compulsion or coercion as the critical factor in such a balance
is both logical and desirable because it moves from the generality
engendered by the invocation of the wall metaphor to a weighing of
the real issue. The real issue is whether freedom from a government
establishment of religion is actually burdened or whether the right
of free exercise is merely being accommodated by a given policy. At
a minimum government should accommodate or facilitate the
exercise of religious expression on an equal basis with other forms
of first amendment expression, 115 provided only that the
accommodation is not coercive and does not place its imprimatur
on any particular religion.
The contention that coercion arises whenever government
astronomy, and all humanities. It is no accident that the preponderance of Nobel
prizes have been won by Americans.
Id.
114. 370 U.S. at 435 n.21. Justice Black noted:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with
the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our
country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence
which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which
include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that
there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise
that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.
Id.
115. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar the Court permitted a
recognized student religious organization to meet on the campus of the University of Missouri at
Kansas City, despite arguments that such religious expression should be limited by the establishment
clause. Id. at 276-77.
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involves itself in religious matters was central to the majority
opinions in Schempp and Engel.116 The difference between the
majority view and Justice Stewart's dissenting view is that Justice
Stewart wanted proof of coercion, while the majority seemed
willing to take judicial notice of coercion. Justice Stewart argued
further that the Court's generalized notions of coercion forced some
people to give up their privileges of free exercise and religious
expression. 1 1 7 For Stewart that deprivation, even if suffered by the
majority, should not occur without actual evidence of coercion. If
evidence of coercion were produced, Justice Stewart would agree to
the restraint. Thus, Justice Stewart's differences with the majority
in Engel and Schempp are more a matter of the degree of proof
required than of substance. Both the majority and Justice Stewart
were concerned with coercion; they differed only on the proof
required to establish coercion.
Justice Stewart might also be criticized on the ground that
there are potentially two free exercise interests involved in Schempp
and Engel: the majority's desire to exercise religion and the minority's opposition to that exercise. If two interests are present, the
Court should balance those interests, and the interests of the
majority would necessarily prevail, particularly if, as Stewart
suggested in Schempp, the matter is left to the discretion of local
boards of education. Justice Stewart might reply to this criticism by
invoking his right-privilege distinction. He could argue that the
free exercise interest of the majority is merely a privilege. That
privilege should be limited when it is coercive. Thus, the Court
would not have to balance the interests; any actual proof of
coercion of the minority would invalidate the majority's privilege
of free exercise in the public sector.
Two points can be made regarding the political divisiveness
issue. First, divisiveness would be minimized under Justice
Stewart's analysis because governmental accommodation would
have to be noncoercive and nonpreferential. Second, even if
minimal divisiveness arises, it should not prohibit the free exercise
of one's religious rights unless the exercise actually disrupts a
strong or genuinely compelling governmental interest or function.
Additionally, as much political divisiveness would arise if
government forbids all public religious exercise or expression as
would arise if it permits all religions, groups, and individuals equal
116. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222: Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
117. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 316-17.
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access or opportunity to exercise their beliefs in the public sector.
The final objection raised by Justice Stewart's detractors, that
religion inhibits the educational process, seems to be the basis of
much of the opposition to the Stewart view. This school of thought
apparently originated in the German positivism extant at the turn
of the century and has been assimilated into public education
theory. Historically, it is argued, religion or educational allegiance
with religion promoted ignorance and blind obedience to religious
ritual and practice, rather than stimulating the inquisitiveness
necessary in an industrialized world. The proponents of the
argument assert that only a totally secular educational experience
stimulates the necessary inquisitiveness. This is the weakest of the
arguments opposing the Stewart position and, therefore, has
remained subliminal. It is weak because it denigrates religious
exercise and clearly prefers, as did German positivism, a world
without theology. Simply stated, this theory of absolute separation
goes too far. The movement's goals are to eliminate the secular
control of established religions and to eliminate the coercive effects
of permitted religious exercises in public. These are admirable
goals. In opting for the positivist's absolute rejection of theology
and public religious exercise, however, advocates of absolute
separation have unduly vitiated religious exercise. Certainly, the
state should not place its imprimatur on any religion or group of
religions to the exclusion of others. Nor should the government
coerce individuals in the exercise of their religious convictions.
However, to demand absolute separation of religious exercise from
the public sector when governmental activity is increasingly
pervasive, unjustifiably restrains individuals from exercising their
rights of religious expression. Justice Stewart offers a practical and
constitutionally justifiable solution to the perplexing conflict
between the free exercise and establishment clauses. Rather than
opting for religious or secular dominance, Justice Stewart would
simply permit government to accommodate voluntary, individual
religious activity. He would permit government to accommodate
individual religious exercise and expression in the public sector,
unless that exercise actually coerces others to participate in
religious expression.
That Justice Stewart's theory -generally fares well against its
absolutist opposition does not imply that it is without its own
internal difficulties. The primary problem is his assertion of the
right-privilege distinction articulated in Schempp. 8 If an
118. Id. at 316. Justice Stewart noted that religious expression was a privilege, not a right. In
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individual's exercise of religion has constitutional merit, it must be
more than a privilege. If it lacks constitutional status, it should be
subject to essentially unrestricted government regulation.
Understandably, Justice Stewart is concerned that if the interest in
exercising religion is treated as a right, it might dominate the
educational system. However, this result could be avoided. In
extreme cases it could be regulated on the ground that it ran afoul
of a compelling state interest. For example, if a given religious
exercise actually inhibited the state's interest in educating children,
that religious exercise could be limited. Additionally, in less
extreme situations the state might limit religious exercise in the
public sector if coercion exists. Thus, the state could not prefer any
religious exercise, and the state would give all religious adherents
equal access or opportunity to exercise their religious convictions in
the public sector, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.
Evidently, Justice Stewart remains uneasy, despite the
foregoing apparent limitations on public religious exercise. Because
of his uneasiness he willingly relegates religious exercise and
expression in the public sector from its normal status as a right to
that of a mere privilege. Perhaps his uneasiness can be best
understood by examining his position in Engel and McRae.
In Engel the state board of education prepared a specific prayer
for "voluntary" recitation in the public schools.1 19 Justice Stewart
dissented from the Court's holding that the state's practice violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. 120 Justice Stewart
disagreed because he felt there had been no proof that the practice
coerced students to follow a particular religious belief. Since
students unwilling to participate in the prayer recitation could
voluntarily excuse themselves or could remain silent, Justice
Stewart felt there was no coercion. 21 He was, therefore, unwilling
to hold that the law violated the establishment clause. Presumably,
Justice Stewart was concerned about the ramifications of placing
the burden of proving coercion on the minority party. Effectively,
the minority would have to challenge the practice and would have
to marshal proof that the practice was actually coercive. The
nature and weight of the proof required under Stewart's analysis
Schempp

"the question presented is not whether exercises such as those at issue here are

constitutionally compelled, but rather whether they are constitutionally invalid." Id.

119. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. The prayer was as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country." Id.
120. Id. at 444.
121. Id. at 445.
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remains unclear. Furthermore, Justice Stewart may have
recognized the minimal likelihood that a suit would be brought
even in exacerbated cases in which the religious activity of a
dominant majority might overwhelm the rights of a minority.
Understandably he may have used the right-privilege distinction to
limit the expansiveness of the practice. There were, however, at
least two senses in which Justice Stewart could have limited the
expansive nature of his dissent in Engel, short of erecting the rightprivilege distinction. He could have found that the prayer
recitation practice in Engel was coercive as a matter of law. In Engel
the law allowed the students who did not want to participate to
remain silent or to absent themselves from the classroom during the
recitation practice. In either case, the nonparticipatory students
might well become the center of attention and might be subjected to
extensive peer pressure. No child should be forced to choose
between peer rejection and allegiance to one's conscience or
religious conviction. The choice could, therefore, be declared
coercive as a matter of law.
Alternatively, Justice Stewart could have found that the Engel
type practice violated the establishment clause without reaching the
coercion issue and without espousing the absolute separation view.
This author has argued elsewhere1 22 that James Madison believed
that government could accommodate the free exercise of religion in
the public sector, provided that the accommodation could be
effectuated in an equal, nonpreferential manner and provided
further that the government strictly refrained from placing its
imprimatur on any religious exercise, religious doctrine, or mode
of worship. The Engel practice violates the Madisonian view in at
least two senses: the government effectively placed its imprimatur
on a particular mode of worship because it composed a prayer for
student recitation; and the government did not treat all religions
equally because students who agreed with the prayer were
permitted to recite it, while students who disagreed or were
unwilling to recite it were not permitted to exercise their religious
beliefs on equal terms, but rather were required to remain silent or
absent themselves. The Engel practice could, therefore, be held
invalid without invoking a right-privilege distinction and without
adopting the strict separationist view that effectively renders free
exercise in the public sector nugatory.
Justice Stewart's opinion in McRae also effectively perpetuated
122. See The PrayerAmendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 199 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 469 (1982) (statement of Rodney K. Smith); Smith, Prayer in Public Schools: A
First Amendment Analysis (Dec. 22, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, LL.M. thesis).
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his questionable belief in the right-privilege distinction. In McRae
Justice Stewart invoked analysis reminiscent of his right-privilege
analysis in Engel. He avoided Justice Brennan's objection that the
government penalized the constitutionally protected abortion
choice by funding the birth choice but refusing to fund the abortion
choice. In McRae, as in Engel, under Justice Stewart's analysis the
state could rather arbitrarily choose whether it desired to promote
or facilitate certain first amendment rights. Again, as Justice
Brennan aptly pointed out in his dissent in McRae, the government
should not be permitted to penalize fundamental rights by the
"selective bestowal of government favors." 123
It is possible that Justice Stewart's opinion in McRae is merely
his effort to limit the expansiveness of the right to an abortion
recognized by the Court in Roe v. Wade. 124 This conclusion is
bolstered by the language used by Justice Stewart in his
concurrence in Roe v. Wade. 125 Although he recognized a liberty
interest in an abortion under the doctrine of substantive due
process, Justice Stewart evidently wanted to give the government
fairly substantial latitude in regulating that interest. There are
distinct parallels, therefore, between Justice Stewart's opinions and
methodology in Engel and Schempp and in Roe and McRae.
Therefore, much of the thrust of Justice Brennan's criticism of
Justice Stewart's opinion in McRae would seem to be applicable by
analogy to Justice Stewart's opinions in Engel and Schempp. Of
course, the analogy is not fully apposite because the free exercise
right, unlike the abortion interest, is expressly set forth in the first
amendment and the free exercise right is arguably limited by the
equally express establishment clause. 126 Nevertheless, both cases
indicate that Justice Stewart's temperament, with its emphasis on
procedural solutions and its restraint regarding substantive issues,
can lead to difficulties when procedural issues are not present and
a substantive resolution is necessary.
123. 448 U.S. at 334. Justice Brennan cited Sherbert to support his view. Id.
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (due process prohibits a state from interfering with a woman's choice
to have an abortion within the first three months of pregnancy).
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). In RoeJustice Stewart
seemed fairly willing, on "particularly careful scrutiny" to recognize state interests in limiting the
abortion right. Id. He stated, "The asserted state interests . . . are legitimate objectives, amply
sufficient to permit a State to regulate abortions as it does other surgical procedures, and perhaps
sufficient to permit a State to regulate abortions more stringently or even to prohibit them in the late
stages of pregnancy." Id. He went on to argue, though, that the State had simply failed to prove that
such interests were actually involved in the case before the Court. Id. Thus, not only did.Justice
Stewart use limiting language in his opinion, he also used the technique invoked in Engel and Schempp
- the State had to prove that it had an actual interest. Thus, Justice Stewart's opinion had
substantial procedural, rather than strictly substantive, overtones.
126. The establishment and free exercise clauses are expressly contained in the first amendment,
while the abortion right is at best a shadow or penumbra of the first amendment originally discerned
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In summary, Justice Stewart's persistent invocation of a rightprivilege distinction in his first amendment freedom of religion
analysis constitutes a substantial flaw in his analysis. While Justice
Stewart was understandably unwilling to give the establishment
clause the expansive, independent force advocated by strict
separationists on the Court, he obviously felt the free exercise right
in the public sector must be limited by more than the traditional
compelling state interest limitation and his coercion analysis. Thus,
when Justice Stewart was unable to resolve the difficult issues in
this area by a procedural examination of the record, his desire to
reach a solution that would be fair to minorities without unduly
limiting the capacity of the legislature may have lulled him into the
creation of an unwarranted right-privilege distinction, which
denigrates the very rights he sought to preserve.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to illustrate that Justice Stewart's view of
religious liberty is not a mixed bag of conventional ideological
liberalism on free exercise issues and conservatism on
establishment clause issues. Rather, Justice Stewart's view can best
be understood in light of his judicial temperament. Additionally,
while Justice Stewart's view is largely defensible against the
arguments typically raised by his detractors, it does have a
substantial and unnecessary flaw, his invocation of a right-privilege
distinction to limit the application of free exercise rights in the
public sector. This flaw is substantial because it relegates the free
exercise right from an essentially inalienable right to a mere
privilege, which the state may arbitrarily limit. This flaw is
unnecessary because Justice Stewart could have limited the
expansiveness of the free exercise right in the public sector by
applying the Madisonian view of the establishment clause, which
recognizes
the government's obligation to permit and
nonpreferentially accommodate the public exercise of religious
rights and expression. Furthermore, by adhering to an historical
by the Court in the second half of the twentieth century. Given Justice Stewart's deference to
legislative prerogative and history, this author is convinced that he should have dissented in Roe. His
failure to eschew the role of the platonic guardian in Roe, while simultaneously trying to give broad
latitude to the state to limit the exercise of the abortion right, was unfortunate not only because it
constituted a clear deviation from the temperament normally underlying his decisions, but also
because it contributed to his subsequent revitalization of the right-privilege distinction in McRae. In
McRae Justice Stewart relegated the abortion right to the status of a mere privilege. Therefore,
Justice Stewart's McRae opinion by direct analogy revitalized the right-privilege distinction, not only
as to the abortion right but also as to the other fundamental rights expressly contained in the first
amendment.
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view, Justice Stewart could have remained consistent with his
philosophy of eschewing the role of a platonic guardian.
Even with this flaw, Justice Stewart's view on religious liberty
deserves more attention than it has received from legal
commentators. Given the difficulty of pigeonholing Justice
Stewart's philosophy into the liberal, conservative, or moderate
ideological categories, the analysis is less appealing to the legal
commentator. When viewed in light of his judicial temperament,
however, Justice Stewart's views present a rich source for
commentary and analysis. It is, therefore, heartily acknowledged
that this Article is as much an invitation to analysis as it is a
disposition of the subject matter.

